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Abstract 
This paper develops a Weberian locational 
triangle model to examine the impacts of 
environmental regulations on a firm’s optimal 
location decisions under demand uncertainty. It 
provides a systematic analysis of a risk-averse 
firm’s choice of plant location and its response 
to the costs of environmental regulation under 
uncertainty. This paper makes contributions to 
the literature by deriving comparative statics 
results with respect to the level of 
environmental regulation. 
    These results demonstrate that 
whether or not the regulation varies across 
space is an important factor for evaluating the 
possibility of individual firms relocationg in 
response to the costs of environmental 
regulation under uncertainty. 
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??????? 
This paper develops a Weberian 
locational triangle model to examine the 
impacts of environmental regulations on a 
firm’s optimal location decisions under 
uncertainty about product demand. It provides a 
systematic analysis of a risk-averse firm’s 
choice of plant location and its response to the 
costs of environmental regulation under 
uncertainty. This paper makes contributions to 
the literature by deriving comparative statics 
results with respect to the level of 
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environmental regulation. 
    These results demonstrate that whether or 
not the regulation varies across space is an 
important factor for evaluating the possibility 
of individual firms relocationg in response to 
the costs of environmental regulation under 
uncertainty? 
 
??????? 
    we consider a competitive firm employs 
two transportable inputs 1M  and 2M  which 
are available only at points A and B, 
respectively. These inputs are used to produce 
output q which is sold at a market (or 
consumption) center C as depicted in Figure 1, 
where E is the optimal location of the firm, 1s  
and 2s  are distances of E from A and B, 
respectively, h is the distance between E and C, 
θ is the angle between CE and CA, β is the 
angle between CA and CB, and a and b are 
lengths of CA and CB, respectively.  
The production function of the firm can be 
specified as: 
( )21 , MMfq =                         
(1) 
The production function implies a minimum 
cost function ),,( 222111 qsrwsrwC ++ , where 
)( 111 srw +  and )( 221 srw +  are delivered 
price of inputs 1M  and 2M  respectively, and 
1s  and 2s  are defined by the law of consines 
as θcos2221 ahhas −+=  and 
)cos(2222 θβ −−+= bhhbs  Assume the 
production function is homothetic, then we can 
write the total cost function as the product of 
two functions: a function of factor prices and 
another function of output Q only.2 Thus we 
have: 
 )(),()( 222111 qHsrwsrwcqC ++=          
             (2) 
where c is a function of the delivered prices of 
1M and 2M . As such, the average cost and 
marginal cost are derivable as 
q
cH
q
qCAC == )(                      (3) 
HcqCMC ′=′= )(                     (4) 
  From (3) and (4), we can define the 
following relation: 
'),( H
q
H
<=>  if and only if the production 
function exhibits increasing( constant, decrea
-sing) returns to scale.   
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 Figure 1   Locational Triangle 
 
We consider mandatory technology 
adoption as the form of environmental 
regulation. In the presence of the environmental 
regulation, firms are usually required to use 
less pollution technologies, which require 
capital investment in new technologies. 
Assume that the fixed cost of abatement 
investment from the investment in a new 
technology depends upon where the firm 
locates its factory. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the annualized fixed cost of abatement 
investment takes the following form: 3 
)()( hkhK α=                            
   (6) 
where α is unit investment cost. 
 
Given the above spatial setting of the 
firm, the profits of the firm are  
)()(),()( 222111 hkqHsrwsrwcqthP απ −⋅++−−=
             (7) 
where P is the price the firm receives for its 
product at the market center. 
At what follows, we consider demand 
( or price ) uncertainty that the firm faces in 
choosing its plant locations: demand (or price) 
and environmental policy uncertainty. 
 
Ⅲ . Optimal Location under Demand 
Uncertainty 
Assume that P is unknown at the time 
decisions have to be made. For simplicity, 
demand is assumed to be subject to additive 
demand uncertainty and given by: 
1 1P P γ ε= +                         (8) 
where 1ε  is a random variable such that 
0)( =εE , 1)( 2 =εE , )(PEP = , 1γ  is a 
positive scaling parameters.  
The firm has a subjective probability 
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density function regarding its profits which are 
given by: 
[ ] )9)(()(),( 22211111 hkqHsrwsrwcqthP αεγπ −⋅++−−+=
             
      The production-location problem of the 
firm under demand uncertainty is to choose the 
optimal values of q, θ and h simultaneously so 
as to maximize its expected utility of the profits. 
That is, 
 M a x  
−−+=≡ QTHPUEUEG ]{[[)]([ 111 εγπ  
)}]()(),( 222111 hkqHswwc αγεγ −++       (10) 
where )( 1πU  is a von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function such that 0>′U  and 0<′′U  
(implying risk aversion). 
     The first-order conditions for the 
expected utility maximization are: 
{ }[ ] 0)()( 11 =′−−+⋅′= qHcthPUEGq εγ  (11)
   
{ }[ ] 0)()()( =⋅−⋅′= qHcUEG θθ           12)
      
{ }[ ] )13(0)()()()( =′−⋅−−⋅′= hkqHctqUEG hh α
              
     Moreover, the second-order conditions 
are assumed to be satisfied. Although vertex 
optima in the triangular space are quite possible, 
the implicit assumption that the optimal 
location cannot be at a vertex is reasonable for 
the qualitative analysis to be done. (See e.g., 
Miller and Jensen (1978), and Eswaran et al 
(1981)). 
First of all, let us examine the impact of 
an increase in the cost of the environmental 
regulation on the optimum location of the firm 
by applying Cramer’s rule to (14): 
[ ]qqhhqq GGGGD
G
d
dh
αα
θθ
α
−=
1
         (15)  
        
where 1D  (the Hessian determinant associated 
with the system of (12)-(14)) < 0, 0<θθG  
and 0<qqG  by the second-order conditions. 
Note that 0>αhG  and 0<αqG  if absolute 
risk aversion is decreasing (as shown in Katz 
(1984)), it follows from (15) that the sign of 
αd
dh  depends on the sign of hqG , which in 
turn is dependent upon not only the 
characteristics of the production function, but 
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also the sign of )(hk ′ . Consequently, we can 
establish: 
Proposition 1: Under demand uncertainty and 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, an increase 
in the cost of the environmental regulation will 
move a risk-averse firm away from the output 
market if the regulation costs vary across space 
with 0)( <′ hk  and if the production function 
is increasing or constant returns scale. 
Nevertheless, when the regulation is uniform 
across space with 0)( =′ hk , the optimum 
location will remain unchanged if the 
production function is constant returns to scale, 
but will move away from (closer to) the output 
market if the production function exhibits 
increasing (decreasing) returns to scale. 
 Next, we consider the effect of an 
increase in the mean product price, P , on the 
location of the firm. Via (14), we obtain: 
)(
1
hqPq GGD
G
Pd
dh θθ
=                 (16) 
  Noting that 0>PqG  if absolute risk 
aversion is decreasing, it then intermediately 
follows from (16) that 0
<
>
Pd
dh  as 0
<
>
hqG . 
Thus, we have: 
Proposition 2:Under demand uncertainty and 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, an increase 
in the mean product price will bring a 
risk-averse firm nearer to the market if 
( ) 0k h′ <  and the production function is 
increasing or constant returns to scale. Its 
impact is found to be ambiguous if the 
production function is decreasing returns to 
scale. When ( ) 0k h′ =  (i.e., the regulation cost 
is uniform across space), the optimum location 
is invariant with respect to a change in the 
expected product price if the production 
function is constant returns to scale. However, 
it moves toward (away from) the market if 
production function exhibits increasing 
(decreasing) returns to scale. 
We now turn to the effect of a marginal 
increase in price uncertainty on the optimum 
location of the firm. From(14), we derive   
)(
11
hgqrGGD
Gh θθ
γ
=
∂
∂                  (17) 
 Noting that Ggγ <0 if absolute risk aversion is 
decreasing. Hence, it follows from (17) that  
1
0h
γ
>∂
<∂
as 0qrG
>
<
. Therefore, we have 
Proposition 3:Under demand uncertainty and 
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decreasing absolute risk aversion, a 
mean-preserving increase in price uncertainty 
more the firm away form the market if 
'( ) 0k h <  and the production function is 
increasing or constant returns to scale. But its 
impact on the optimum location is ambiguous if 
the production function is decreasing returns to 
scale. Nevertheless, if ' ( ) 0k h = , the optimum 
location move away from(nearer to) the market 
if the production is increasing (decreasing) 
returns to scale. The optimum (loctation 
remains unchanged if the production function 
is constant returns to scale. 
 
IV Concluding Remarks 
    This paper develops a Weberian locational 
triangle model to examine the impacts of 
environmental regulations on a firm’s optimal 
location decisions under uncertainty about 
product demand. It provides a systematic 
analysis of a risk-averse firm’s choice of plant 
location and its response to the costs of 
environmental regulation under uncertainty. 
This paper makes contributions to the literature 
by deriving comparative statics results with 
respect to the level of environmental regulation. 
    These results demonstrate that whether or 
not the regulation varies across space is an 
important factor for evaluating the possibility 
of individual firms relocationg in response to 
the costs of environmental regulation under 
uncertainty. More specifically, we obtain 
several striking results.  
(i)  We find that under demand uncertainty 
and decreasing absolute risk aversion, the 
impacts of an increase in the mean price as well 
as a mean-preserving increase in price 
uncertainty on the optimal locaton of the firm 
are ambiguous if the production function is 
decreasing returns to scale and if the cost of 
regulation decreases with increase in distance 
from the market. This is in constrast with 
Katz’s(1984) result that the firm’s optimal 
location moves away from (toward) the market 
as a result of an increase in the mean product 
price ( a mean-preserving increase in price 
uncertainty ) if the production function exhibits 
decreasing returns to scale. It should be 
emphasited that when the regulation costs are 
uniform across space 0)(' =hk , these impacts 
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is qualitatively similar to the one derived by 
Katz(1984).  
(ii) Under demand uncertainty and decreasing 
absolute ridk aversion, an increase in the cost 
of environmental regulation(i.e., a stricter 
environmental policy) will move a risk-averse 
firm away from the output market if the 
regulation costs decrease with increase in 
distance from the market and if the production 
function is increasing or constant returns to 
scale. Nevertheless the impact is ambiguous if 
the production function is decreasing returns to 
scale. However, when the regulation is uniform 
across space, the optimum location will remain 
unchanged under constant returns production 
function, but will move away from(closer to) 
the output market if the production function is 
increasing(decreasing) returns to scale. 
 
???????? 
    The comparative statics results derived in 
this paper have implications for the design and 
implementation of environmental policies for 
controlling pollution. In addition, these results 
have implications for difference in U.S. state 
water quality regulations and their influence on 
the locations of firms in the U.S. It also 
provides a reasonable explanation for the 
possibility of the U.S. manufacturing plant 
relocating to Mexico which was an important 
issue in North American Free Trade Agreement 
debate. 
     Our study not only contribute to the 
literature, but also provides some policy 
implications for decision-makers. We wish to 
publish our work in international journal. 
?????? 
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